Sunday, October 19, 2014

'The Cardinal Difficulty with Naturalism'

In Chapter 3 of his Miracles, Lewis' argument is simultaneously thick while his point is simple: Reason must precede Nature. Too sort out the logic of the chapter, I have tried to confer the argument in a syllogistic outline (which is neither my forte nor my preference). But I have done so, not only for my own sake, but for the sake of others, that the argument can become less opaque. Below is my best effort strewn together over free time during a couple of days.



I.                    It is clear that everything we know, beyond our own immediate sensations, is inferred from those sensations.
a.       Put in its most general form the inference would run, ‘Since I am presented with colours, sounds, shapes, pleasures and pains which I cannot perfectly predict or control, and since the more I investigate them the more regular their behaviour appears, therefore there must exist something other than myself and it must be systematic’.
II.                  All possible knowledge, then, depends on the validity of reasoning… Unless human reasoning is valid no science can be true.
III.                It follows that no account of the universe can be true unless that account leaves it possible for our thinking to be a real insight.
IV.                Naturalism discredits our processes of reasoning or at least reduces their credit to such a humble level that it can no longer support Naturalism itself.
a.       There are two senses of the word ‘because’.
                                                               i.      Cause and Effect
1.       Definition
a.       a dynamic connection between events or ‘states of affairs’
b.      essential to every event in Nature
2.       Example
a.       ’Grandfather is ill today because he ate lobster yesterday.’
b.      ’He cried out because it hurt him.’
                                                             ii.      Ground and Consequent
1.       Definition
a.       a logical relation between beliefs or assertions
b.      essential to valid trains of reasoning
2.       Example
a.       ’Grandfather is ill today because he hasn’t got up yet (and we know he is an invariably early riser when he is well).’
b.      ’It must have hurt him because he cried out.’
b.      Two answers to the question ‘Why do you think this?’
                                                               i.      Because…’ (Ground-Consequent)
1.       Valid thinking flows thusly: One truth necessarily follows from another truth.
                                                             ii.      Because…’ (Cause-Effect)
1.       Our acts of thinking are events.
2.       Every event in Nature must be connected with previous events.
3.       Our acts of thinking must be connected with previous events.
c.       This raises a dilemma: How can a thought-event be both valid and caused? Or What is the relationship between logical causation and natural causation in the event of a thought?
                                                               i.      To be caused is not to be proved.
1.       Example
a.       Wishful thinkings, prejudices, and the delusions of madness, are all caused but they are ungrounded.
2.       Often, in fact, if a thought can be wholly accounted for in terms of cause, it is considered false.
a.       Example
                                                                                                                                       i.      ‘You say that because you are a capitalist, or a hypochondriac, or a mere man, or only a woman.’
3.       The system of logic (ground-consequent) and the system of nature (cause-effect) are wholly distinct.
                                                             ii.      But even if a thought is grounded, this seems irrelevant to its causation.
1.       Thoughts tend to happen both logically and illogically – in either case, they are caused.
                                                            iii.      The solution may be this: We must say that just as one way in which a mental event causes a subsequent mental event is by Association (when I think of parsnips I think of my first school), so another way in which it can cause it, is simply by being a ground for it.
1.       Being logical causes a thought to happen.
2.       Being a cause and being a proof coincide.
                                                           iv.      But this is false because a thought does not cause (like a trigger) the thoughts which logically precede or proceed from it.
1.       This would mean thinking the thought ‘This is glass’ would instantly trigger an infinite series of thoughts that are deduced from it.
                                                             v.      So then, this: One thought can cause another not by being, but by being seen to be, a ground for it.
                                                           vi.      Thoughts are unique events.
1.       Most events are value neutral (neither true or false, but merely states of affairs.)
a.       To say ‘these events, or facts are false’ means of course that someone’s account of them is false.
2.       But a thought is about something other than itself and can be true or false.
                                                          vii.      Acts of inference demand to be seen in two lights:
1.       A subjective event in somebody’s psychological history.
a.       In the inference ‘If A, then B’ we would say ‘Thought B followed Thought A’.
2.       They are insights into, or knowings of, something other than themselves.
a.       In the inference ‘If A, then B’ we would say ‘A follows from B’.
                                                                                                                                       i.      If it ever ‘follows from’ in the logical sense, it does so always.
b.      We cannot possibly reject this as a subjective illusion without discrediting all human knowledge.
                                                                                                                                       i.      We can know nothing, beyond our own sensations at the moment unless the act of inference is the real insight that it claims to be.
                                                                                                                                     ii.      An act of knowing must be determined, in a sense, solely by what is known; we must know it to be thus solely because it is thus. That is what knowing means.
3.       An act of knowing can be described in the Cause-Effect version of ‘because’ – but uniquely so.
a.       An act of knowing is conditioned by attention, states of will, and health.
b.      But its positive content is determined by the truth it knows.
c.       It is caused, but it is not determined by the sum of its causes.
d.      Any thing which professes to explain our reasoning fully without introducing an act of knowing thus solely determined by what is known, is really a theory that there is no reasoning.
e.      Naturalism offers what professes to be a full account of our mental behaviour; but this account, on inspection, leaves no room for acts of knowing or insight on which the whole value of our thinking, as a means of truth, depends.
V.                  The origin of reason, historically, is difficult to account for on a purely naturalistic basis.
a.       Mental behaviour is to be distinguished from Rational Thought.
                                                               i.      Natural selection adequately explains the arrival of complex mental faculties.
1.       Lewis uses the example of vision.
                                                             ii.      Rational Thought is marked by abstract (reflective) thought.
1.       Our Physical vision is a far more useful response to light than that of cruder organisms which have only a photo-sensitive spot. But neither this improvement nor any possible improvements we can suppose could bring it an inch nearer to being a knowledge of light.
2.       It is not men with specially good eyes who know about light, but men who have studied the relevant sciences.
b.      Tradition and Repeated experience are to be distinguished from Rational Thought.
                                                               i.      Repeated experiences of finding fire where he had seen smoke would condition a man to expect fire whenever he saw smoke. This expectation, expressed in the form ‘If smoke, then fire’ becomes what we call inference.
1.       All such inferences are invalid.
a.       Example
                                                                                                                                       i.      Water always boils at 212 (until someone tried a picnic in the mountain).
2.       The assumption that things which have been conjoined in the past will always be conjoined in the future is the guiding principle not of rational but of animal behaviour.
                                                             ii.      Reason comes in precisely when you make the inference ‘Since always conjoined, therefore probably connected’ and go on to attempt the discovery of the connection.
                                                            iii.      Sometimes, an inference can be made without experience.
1.       In these cases, those inferences proceed from tautologies (axioms).
2.       Tautologies are things which are completely and certainly known.
3.       The degree to which any true proportion is a tautology depends on the degree of your insight into it.
a.       Example
                                                                                                                                       i.      9 x 7 = 63 is a tautology to an arithmetician.
                                                                                                                                     ii.      9 x 7 = 63 is not a tautology to a child.
4.       If Nature is a totally interlocked system, then every true statement about her would be a tautology to an intelligence that could grasp that system in its entirety.
VI.                The problem is this: a naturalistic history is… an account in Cause and Effect terms, of how people came to think the way they do. And this of course leaves in the air the quite different question of how they could possibly be justified in so thinking.
a.       This imposes on him the very embarrassing task of trying to show how the evolutionary product which he has described could also be a power of ‘seeing’ truths.
b.      The naturalist may in turn claim that inference, too, is a product of natural selection, even if we cannot yet explain the origin of inference.
                                                               i.      The argument goes thusly:
1.       What is most useful is what is selected.
2.       Inference is quite useful.
3.       Therefore, it is likely naturally selected.
                                                             ii.      ‘If useful, then true.’
                                                            iii.      This, of course, is an inference.
1.       And so is reducible to mere matters of Cause and Effect.             
c.       The humble alternative for the naturalist is to suspend any value to things like theology, ontology, metaphysics, etc…
                                                               i.      But this also means suspension of belief in naturalism, which is, after all, a metaphysical claim.
VII.              Theism, on the other hand, offers itself as a less audacious alternative to naturalism.
a.       For the theist, reason is older than Nature, and is the source of nature’s orderliness.
b.      Reason, Logic, and Order, inherent in God, and imparted to Nature, is the very thing that allows us to know Nature.
c.       To subsume Reason under Nature would be to lose both Reason and Nature.

Saturday, July 26, 2014

Divine Incompressibility in the Church Fathers

Marion demonstrates the deeply patristic pedigree of divine incompressibility:
Consequently the requirement to neither know nor name God in terms of presence traverses the entirety of Christian theology. (a) It appears in the Apologists of the second century - first Justin Martyr: "No one can utter a name for the ineffable God;" then Athenagoras: "Hear this, oh man: the form of God cannot be uttered, nor expressed and eyes of flesh do not have the power to see it." (b) Likewise, it shows up in the first of the Alexandrians - take the Christians, first Clement "the First Cause is not in space, but above space and time and name and conception ... For our interrogation bears on the formless and invisible"; "invisible and incapable of being circumscribed"; "the invisible and ineffable God." Then Origen: "God is incomprehensible and incapable of being measured." Consider also Philo, the Jew: "It is a great good to comprehend that God is incomprehensible in terms of his Being and to see that he is invisible." (c) And also Athanasius: "God is good and the friend of men.... By his nature, he is invisible and incomprehensible, residing beyond all begotten essence." (d) Basil clearly indicates the paradox with this remark: "[K]nowledge of the of the divine essence involves sensing His incompressibility." (e) And there is nothing surprising in the fact that Gregory of Nyssa should have repeated it almost word for word: "This is the true knowledge of what is sought [sc., seeing the invisible and incomprehensible God] - ; this is the seeing that consists in not seeing, because that which is sought transcends all knowledge, being separated on all sides by incompressibility as by a kind of darkness." (f) John Chrysostom parses it in a slightly different form: "All the while knowing that God is, he [Saint Paul] does not know what his essence is," for "the essence of God is incomprehensible." (g) Of course John of Damascus comes next: "No one has seen God. The only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father has himself taught this. The divine is ineffable and incomprehensible" (h) Nothing different from Augustine: "God the highest, who is known better than knowing." (i) Nor from Bernard: "Non ea disputatio comprehendit, sed sanctitas: si quo modo tamen comprehendi potest quod incomprehensibile est." (k) Nor even from Thomas Aquinas, for whom seeing as "what God himself is remains hidden and unknown," it is necessary that man knows how to unknown. Thomas therefore comments on the principle advanced by Dionysius in perfectly appropriate terms: "[W]hat the substance of God is remains in excess of our intellect and therefore is unknown to us; on account of this, the highest human knowledge of God is to know that one does not know God." Without continuing ad infinitum with this anthology of citations, it seems legitimate to admit as a fact still to be explained that at least for the Church Fathers theology does not consist in naming God properly, but in knowing him precisely as what cannot be known properly - what must not be known, if one wants to know it as such.

Sunday, July 20, 2014

Christian Words

One of the more beautiful passages from Against Christianity (p. 68):
"Several years ago, I happened to be visiting my parents when a longtime friend of my mother died. As I left the funeral, I spoke briefly to the woman's son and in parting said, 'The Lord be with you.' Without hesitation, he responded , 'And also with you.' We had not seen one another in nearly a decade, but in that moment our common training in the Lutheran liturgy gave us words to say - Christian words - words of comfort and encouragement in the face of death.

Our common training in liturgy had taught us, in that moment at least, to speak Christianly."
I recalled this passage a week into Lent, the day we buried my brother-in-law, and stood silently over the grave site. My Irish uncle suggested we say an Our Father before departing, which we in turn did. It felt meet and right to have the grace of such words of solidarity in the face of death. And even now, as I never know soundly how to pray rightly, having the words of our Lord is an incredible blessing.

Saturday, October 19, 2013

Symbolism

Schmemann, The Eucharist, p. 39:
This means that in the final analysis the true and original symbol is inseparable from faith, for faith is "the evidence of things unseen" (Heb 11:1), the knowledge that there is another reality different from the "empirical" one, and that this reality can be entered, can be communicated, can in truth become "the most real of realities." Therefore, if the symbol presupposes faith, faith of necessity requires the symbol. For, unlike "convictions," philosophical "points of view," etc., faith certainly is contact and a thirst for contact, embodiment and a thirst for embodiment: it is the manifestation, the presence, the operation of one reality within the other. All of this is the symbol (from simballo, "unite," "hold together"). In it - unlike in a simple "illustration," simple sign, and even in the sacrament in its scholastic-rationalistic "reduction" - the empirical (or "visible") and the spiritual (or "invisible") are united not logically (this "stands for" that), nor analogically (this "illustrates" that), nor yet by cause and effect (this is the "means" or "generator" of that), but epiphanically. One reality manifests (epiphaino) and communicates the other, but - and this is immensely important - only to the degree to which the symbol itself is a participant in the spiritual reality and is able or called upon to embody it. In other words, into the symbol everything manifests the spiritual reality, but not everything pertaining to the spiritual reality appears embodied in the symbol. The symbol is always partial, always imperfect: "for our knowledge is imperfect and our prophecy is imperfect" (1 Co 13:9). By its very nature the symbol unites disparate realities, the relation of the one to the other always remaining "absolutely other." However, real a symbol may be, however successfully it may communicate to us that other reality, its function is not to quench our thirst but to intensify it:"Grant us that we may more perfectly partake of Thee in the never ending day of Thy Kingdom." It is not that this or that part of "this world" - space, time, or matter - be made sacred, but rather that everything in it be seen and comprehended as expectation and thirst for its complete spiritualization: "that God may be all in all."

Friday, September 27, 2013

Superstition

DBH, "At some level, it is even tempting to think that since strict materialism is among the most incoherent of superstitions - one that has never really asked the question of the being of things in any depth or with any persistence, or one that has at best attempted to conjure that question away as a fallacy of grammar - it is incapable of imagining any conception of God more sophisticated than its own. The materialist encounters an instance of unjust suffering and, by a sort of magical thinking, concludes from the absence of any immediately visible moral order that there must be nothing transcendent of material causality, in much the same way that certain of our more remote, primitive ancestors might have seen a flash of lightning in the sky and concluded that some god must have flung it from on high. In neither case (though in the latter case the reasoning is somewhat more rigorous); and in neither case is the god at issue much more than an affective myth." -Doors of the Sea, p. 10

Tuesday, September 17, 2013

Prologue

Because the Master of Catholic Truth ought not only to teach the proficient, but also to instruct the beginners (according to the Apostle: As Unto Little Ones in Christ, I Have You Milk to Drink, Not Meat - 1 Cor. iii. 1, 2), we purpose in this book to treat whatever belongs to the Christian Religion, in such a way as may tend to the instruction of beginners. We have considered that students in this Science have not seldom been hampered by what they have found written by other authors, partly on account of the multiplication of useless questions, articles, and arguments; partly also because those things that are needful for them to know are not taught according to the order of the subject matter, but according as the plan of the book might require, or the occasion of the argument offer; partly, too, because frequent repetition brought weariness and confusion to the minds of the readers.

Endeavoring to avoid these and other like faults, we shall try, by God's help, to set forth whatever is included in this Sacred Science as briefly and clearly as the matter itself may allow.

Monday, August 5, 2013

"Nothing is without meaning."

Nothing is without meaning.

Nothing is without meaning.

Nothing is without meaning.

Nothing is without meaning.

Nothing is without meaning.

Tuesday, June 4, 2013

True Story

A student wrote this for a project we are working on:
Once their was a evil teacher named Mr. Schultz, one of his students got so mad that she wasn't good at math that she planned to make him poor. For every problem she got wrong, he lost 3,000 dollars. When the FCAT came around Mr. Schultz was nervous, very nervous...

She got every problem wrong and Mr. Schultz had no money. So Mr. Schultz applied for McDonalds but not even they would let him work there.

Mr. Schultz was very sad and his wife left. Even his baby craweled away from him. He drank from dirty puddles and ate from dumpsters.

Mr. Schultz decided to get into a bad habbit of abusing animals. So he got taken to jail. Everyone laughed at him. And the rest of his days were sad lonely and miserble.
I left the spelling and grammar errors in to preserve the middle school charm.

Saturday, May 4, 2013

Common Sense?

One of my atheist friends and I were talking a few days ago:
Him: ...you know that horrible taste of medicine?

Me: Yeh, I remember the first time I tasted it - I was like "What is going on! Why is this so horrible!"

Him: Yeh, that's our body telling us that that is poison.

Me: Hmm, maybe.

Him: Seriously, think about it.

Me: Pizza tastes really good, is that my body telling me that it's good for me?

Him: Exactly, things that are good for you taste good.

Me: So, pizza tastes so good because it contains a lot of nutrients. That's why you're not supposed to eat to much of it. Things that taste delicious should me eaten sparingly. Like candy.

Him: Yes.

Me: You know, from an entirely empirical worldview, there's no way to demonstrate that Why.

Him: Yes, I know what you mean.

Me: You can demonstrate using empirical evidence that the pizza tastes good and that medicine doesn't. But you can't go the next step and say Why? That's all speculative.

Him: I know where you're going with this. We've talked about this before. Well, it's a hypothesis. It helps explain a lot of other things.

Me: But what allows you to do that?

Him: You have to use common sense.

Me: Hmm. Remember how I said that I have some questions for Lewis?

Him: Yes.

Me: This is one of those questions. I don't think you can account for common sense. You have to be able to account for it to use it.
At which point we were interrupted.

Saturday, March 16, 2013

The Senses of 'History'

Wright opens up his, to date, most thorough tome (pp. 12-14), with a helpful typology of 'history' that really frees up the booklength argument to unfold with focus and cogency:

It has frequently been argued, indeed insisted upon, that whatever we mean by the resurrection of Jesus, it is not accessible to historical investigation. Some have even suggested that it is not to be thought of in any meaningful sense as 'an event within history' at all. The archers cannot see the target properly; some doubt if it even exists. Over against this, I shall argue that the resurrection of Jesus, whatever it was, can and must be seen as at least a historical problem.

What, though, do we mean by 'historical'? 'History' and its cognates have been used, within debates about Jesus and the resurrection, in at least five significantly different ways.

First, there is history as event. If we say something is 'historical' in this sense, it happened, whether or not we can know or prove that it happened. The death of the last pterodactyl is in that sense a historical event, even though no human witnessed it or wrote about it at the time, and we are very unlikely ever to discover when and where it took place. Similarly, we use the word 'historical' of persons or things, to indicate simply and solely that they existed.

Second, there is history as significant event. Not all events are significant; history, it is often assumed, consists of the ones that are. The adjective that tends to go with this is 'historic'; 'a historic event' is not simply an event that took place, but one whose occurrence carried momentous consequences. Likewise, a 'historic' person, building or object is one perceived to have had particular significance, not merely existence. Rudolf Bultmann, himself arguably a historic figure within the discipline of New Testament studies, famously used the adjective geschichtlich to convey this sense, over against historisch (sense 1).

Third, there is history as provable event. To say that something is 'historical' in this sense is to say not only that it happened but that we can demonstrate that it happened, on the analogy of mathematics or the so-called hard sciences. This is somewhat more controversial. To say 'x may have happened, but we can't prove it, so it isn't really historical' may not be self-contradictory, but it is clearly operating with a more restricted sense of 'history' than some of the others.

Fourth, and quite different from the previous three, there is history as writing-about-events-in-the-past. To say something is 'historical' in this sense is to say that it was written about, or perhaps could in principle have been written about. (This might even include 'historical' novels.) A variant on this, though an important one, is oral history; at a time when many regarded it as carrying more authority than the written, history as speaking-about-events-in-the-past is not to be sneezed at.

Fifth and finally, a combination of (3) and (4) is often found precisely in discussion of Jesus: history as what modern historians can say about a topic. By 'modern' I mean 'post-Enlightenment', the period in which people have imagined some kind of analogy, even correlation, between history and the hard sciences. In this sense, 'historical' means not only that which can be demonstrated and written, but that which can be demonstrated and written within the post-Enlightenment worldview. This is what people have often had in mind when they rejected 'the historical Jesus' (which hereby, of course, comes to mean 'the Jesus that fits the Procrustean bed of a reductionist worldview') in favor of 'the Christ of faith'.

Confusion between these senses has of course bedevilled this very debate about the so-called 'historical Jesus', the phrase being used by some to mean Jesus as he actually was (sense 1), by others to mean what was significant about Jesus (sense 2), by others to mean that which we can prove about Jesus, as opposed to that which we must either doubt or take on faith alone (sense 3); by others again to mean what people have written about Jesus (sense 4). Those who, as I mentioned, have taken the phrase in sense 5 have often rejected the Jesus not only of that sense but, apparently, of the previous 4 as well. Jesus and the Victory of God constitutes, in part, a response to this position. But what we must now face one very specific, particular and in some senses peculiar case of the problem. In what sense, if any, can Jesus' resurrection be spoken of as 'historical'?

Ever since the time of Paul, people have tried to write about Jesus' resurrection (whatever they meant by that). The question of course, rebounds: were they thereby writing about an event in the past? Were they writing 'history'? Or was it all actually the projection of their own faith-experience? When they said 'Jesus was raised from the dead on the third day', were they intending to makes some kind of historical claim about Jesus, or did they themselves know this was a metaphor for their own remarkable new religious experience, the rise of their faith, and so on? This pushes us back to sense 1, which is the question at stake throughout much of this book: was the resurrection something that actually happened, and if so what precisely was it that happened? We do not seem to have had much polemic against 'the historical resurrection' in the same way that there has been angry rejection of 'the historical Jesus'.

There is no problem about predicating sense 2 of Jesus' resurrection. Virtually everyone will agree that whatever-it-was-that-happened was extremely significant. Indeed, some recent writers agree that it was very significant while continuing to argue that we cannot know what 'it' is. There are enormous problems about sense 3: it all depends on what you mean by 'proof', and we shall return to that question in due course. Sense 4 is unproblematic: the 'event' has been written about, even if it was all made up. But it is sense 5 that has caused the real headache: what can historians in today's world say on the subject? Unless we keep these distinctions clear in our minds as we proceed, we shall not just have enormous problems; we shall go round in ever-decreasing circles. [source]